04/4/11 - Gaddafi apparently “slept on it,” over the weekend and decided, after a raft of defections from senior posts, that he had better seek a diplomatic solution. Al Jazeera reports: “Abdel Ati al-Obeidi, Libya's acting foreign minister, told the Greek prime minister in Athens that Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi wants the fighting to end.” Italy earlier dismissed a message seeking negotiations from the same envoy as it did not meet the condition that Gaddafi step down. They then joined France in recognizing the Libyan revolution as the legitimate government of Libya.
So I have to take issue with the latest assessment article by Debka again, where they headline: “America’s exit from Libya ends coalition no-fly zone, military campaign.” This article again has that strange “pro-Gaddafi” slant to it that a lot of Debka’s coverage of this story has had in the past. Earlier they stated the coalition had but 6 aircraft aloft (on day 2 of the campaign), that Gaddafi was hiding all his aircraft in secret bases in the south where the US could not strike them, as if our B-2 stealth bombers, flying from the heart of the US itself, just couldn’t make that last few miles. They stated that Gaddafi was similarly hiding all his best AA weapons and SAMs, ( I suppose to use on another day when he was not under air attack). In their view Gaddafi has been the strong, implacable tribal leader, dictating terms to the West, scheming, dreaming up secret plans, and hiding in a remote desert compound as he systematically dismantles the coalition air campaign.
First off, it is ludicrous to suggest that the no-fly zone has ended. While it is true that the US is now taking a support role, this move was announced at the outset of the campaign. Any awareness of the actual sorties flown and strikes made will demonstrate that coalition forces are still very much active. NATO flew 184 sorties with 70 of those being “strikes” in the last 24 hours. Doesn’t sound like the coalition effort has ended at all, does it?
The US carried about 50% of the strike burden in the first two weeks, and fired most of the Tomahawks used in the early days. It will wind up combat missions on Monday and move to a stand-by role. But Libya is not all that “target rich” in the first place, and the primary mission of the US was to assure suppression of Libya’s air defense systems and command control assets so that the NATO coalition could take over. This was done, and the remaining coalition partners will now focus on ground support and routine patrol over selected air zones--the only zones that matter, which are near the coastal cities under contention. Gaddafi is not challenging coalition aircraft from the ground, and has flown exactly 1 trainer class aircraft since the no fly zone started. In effect, he has no air force or air defense system worth mentioning. Yet Debka sees it otherwise. They report: “Qaddafi has taken advantage of coalition shortcomings to start deploying his fleet of 145 large air transports. Free of around 90 percent of Libyan airspace, they are now able to move troop reinforcements and ordnance from place to place.” Debka sites no evidence to back up this claim, and I find it laughable that they think Gaddafi is flying these planes, on a scale that would rival a major airline, using large, cumbersome, easily detected transport aircraft all over Libya to position troops and supplies. Has Debka heard of AWACS?
The US carried about 50% of the strike burden in the first two weeks, and fired most of the Tomahawks used in the early days. It will wind up combat missions on Monday and move to a stand-by role. But Libya is not all that “target rich” in the first place, and the primary mission of the US was to assure suppression of Libya’s air defense systems and command control assets so that the NATO coalition could take over. This was done, and the remaining coalition partners will now focus on ground support and routine patrol over selected air zones--the only zones that matter, which are near the coastal cities under contention. Gaddafi is not challenging coalition aircraft from the ground, and has flown exactly 1 trainer class aircraft since the no fly zone started. In effect, he has no air force or air defense system worth mentioning. Yet Debka sees it otherwise. They report: “Qaddafi has taken advantage of coalition shortcomings to start deploying his fleet of 145 large air transports. Free of around 90 percent of Libyan airspace, they are now able to move troop reinforcements and ordnance from place to place.” Debka sites no evidence to back up this claim, and I find it laughable that they think Gaddafi is flying these planes, on a scale that would rival a major airline, using large, cumbersome, easily detected transport aircraft all over Libya to position troops and supplies. Has Debka heard of AWACS?
Debka also states that all Gaddafi’s front line units are still 80% effective, implying their losses to coalition strikes were not significant. I suppose this is why they had to abandon all their remaining heavy armor and take up riding in civilian cars and trucks. (Or perhaps they are “hiding” all their remaining tanks and APCs in secret desert bases “in the south?”)
Debka does not explain why, if units like the Khamis and Saadi “Brigades” are still so effective, they have been stopped by a battalion sized force of ex-army and para-military units deployed by the rebellion at Mersa el Brega. (When they rolled merrily up to Benghazi 10 days ago) when they still had the bulk of their heavy armor and artillery. The answer is simple--they no longer have the combat power to advance, particularly with coalition fighters ready to intensify operations against them whenever needed. Their strategy now has been to dilute their forces into smaller groups, revert to smaller, more mobile mortar teams for artillery support, use superior tactics to outwit their untrained opponents in the open desert terrain. They ride in civilian cars, so as not to attract air strikes. This will see them prevail over the school boys the revolution sent against them on the road leading to Tripoli, but it will certainly not get them Benghazi back.
Debka goes on to write: “With the Americans gone, Qaddafi is free to start rebuilding the air defenses and command centers which their attacks crippled; he is now in a position to effectively shut down the Western allied military campaign to topple him.” I suppose this is why his new foreign minister is hopping from Italy to Greece to Turkey looking for a cease fire. No, far from being the sinister, undaunted, mastermind of the deep desert, Qaddafi realizes several facts that should be obvious to even Debka: 1) He will never regain control of eastern Libya. 2) His military can no longer concentrate the necessary force of armor, artillery and ground combat power to retake and effectively control the larger cities there. (He has yet to take Misurata after a month of trying, and one can only imagine that he would have even more trouble in places like Benghazi). So a military victory is not on the table for him, and he knows it. He can fight to a stalemate until the rebels pull together and learn the craft of war to effectively defeat him. The US is now organizing covert training and weapons for the revolution, and the young recruits are gradually learning, in the school of hard knocks, how to fight on the ground. This will take time, but the rebel position will only get stronger over time; Gaddafi’s only weaker as the ground campaign proceeds.
04/1-04/2- Gaddafi forces rejected a cease fire stating it was “mad” to presume they should withdraw from their own cities. Fighting continued at Mersa El Brega, where rebel forces claimed they had pushed Gaddafi units out of the town and were now hunting down stragglers and snipers. Once again, the rebels show they do much better in urban environments, while Gaddafi forces hold the edge in open terrain. The rebels have now divided their fighters into two groups. A smaller group of men from ex-army units and those who have had some basic military training have been placed on the front lines. The larger, untrained group of fighters is regrouping at Ajdabiya. The better trained fighters stopped the Gaddafi advance and retook Mersa el Brega. This is how the rebels must reorganize and learn to fight, using the mass of untrained men to feed in as replacements where the better trained men can slowly teach the raw recruits some basic skills. Gaddafi troops are also adapting, and now fight from civilian vehicles to frustrate NATO air strikes. This led to a coalition strike that killed 10 rebel fighters today. Fighting continues in Misurata, but it does not appear that Gaddafi troops will be able to push much further on the road to Benghazi.
03/30-03/31- Fighting continued at Misurata, where a US P-3 maritime Patrol aircraft and an A-10 ground attack plane fired maverick missiles and the A-10s heavy cannon at a Libyan coast guard ship that was firing on the port. The Libyan ship was beached to prevent it from sinking. In the east, Gaddafi forces pushed the rebels out of Ras Lanuf for the second time in a month today. The badly organized rebels complained that they lack arms and need Coalition air support to advance--both true. President Obama said he left the question of arming the rebels open, but with this step comes the need for advisers and training. This is a commitment of money, troops and time, which further involves the US in the rebel cause, should it happen.
04/1-04/2- Gaddafi forces rejected a cease fire stating it was “mad” to presume they should withdraw from their own cities. Fighting continued at Mersa El Brega, where rebel forces claimed they had pushed Gaddafi units out of the town and were now hunting down stragglers and snipers. Once again, the rebels show they do much better in urban environments, while Gaddafi forces hold the edge in open terrain. The rebels have now divided their fighters into two groups. A smaller group of men from ex-army units and those who have had some basic military training have been placed on the front lines. The larger, untrained group of fighters is regrouping at Ajdabiya. The better trained fighters stopped the Gaddafi advance and retook Mersa el Brega. This is how the rebels must reorganize and learn to fight, using the mass of untrained men to feed in as replacements where the better trained men can slowly teach the raw recruits some basic skills. Gaddafi troops are also adapting, and now fight from civilian vehicles to frustrate NATO air strikes. This led to a coalition strike that killed 10 rebel fighters today. Fighting continues in Misurata, but it does not appear that Gaddafi troops will be able to push much further on the road to Benghazi.
03/30-03/31- Fighting continued at Misurata, where a US P-3 maritime Patrol aircraft and an A-10 ground attack plane fired maverick missiles and the A-10s heavy cannon at a Libyan coast guard ship that was firing on the port. The Libyan ship was beached to prevent it from sinking. In the east, Gaddafi forces pushed the rebels out of Ras Lanuf for the second time in a month today. The badly organized rebels complained that they lack arms and need Coalition air support to advance--both true. President Obama said he left the question of arming the rebels open, but with this step comes the need for advisers and training. This is a commitment of money, troops and time, which further involves the US in the rebel cause, should it happen.
Gaddafi forces clearly drew a “line of death” in the sand at Nawfaliyah, determined to defend the strategic and symbolic town of Surt. Their counterattack now nears Mersa el Brega, opening up the likelihood that they will again draw more intense Coalition air strikes. But unless the Coalition decides to simply obliterate the main strength of Gaddafi’s eastern campaign force, the rebels will have little offensive capability in this terrain. In my opinion, the West should simply communicate to Gaddafi that, as he continues to violate the UN order to cease hostilities, all his units, not simply selected tanks and APCs, will now be heavily targeted by air strikes unless they stand down and withdraw. To forestall this possibility, Gaddafi forces have switched to using light jeeps and civilian vehicles, to mask their appearance from the air and make it more difficult for Coalition aircraft to target them.
But the question gets very thorny when the rebels approach Surt, a town with “civilians” that will clearly support Gaddafi. Would the Coalition have to prevent rebel attacks on that city as well? The makings of “stalemate” are written all over this conflict. The rebel fighters are using old arms, running low on ammunition, and some still don’t even know how to load their rifles when the do find ammo. They fire their light artillery in the wrong direction, waste what little ammo they have with joy shots into the air, race around in disorganized groups of Toyota pickups, and scatter at the first signs of enemy advance. On average, it takes six months to give a new recruit basic military training. The rebels are now in “the school of hard knocks,” but they have not proved to be diligent students. Talking about what to do with Libya after Gaddafi leaves, Western leaders may be counting their chickens before they hatch.
03/29/11 - Where is Lawrence? The exuberance of youth gave way to its equal inexperience when rebel forces, confronted by a well designed blocking position at Nawfaliyah were stopped on the road to Surt, and then pushed back when a column of pro-Gaddafi army reinforcements reached the area from Misurata. The rebels showed that they have almost no real offensive military capability on the open coastal plain, where Gaddafi’s better trained and organized army units seem to scatter them with the slightest sign of an advance. Western correspondents in the region note the young rebel fighters simply race down the roads in pickup trucks, seeing how far they can advance. They do not properly reconnoiter the ground and enemy positions ahead, they do not give thought to protecting their flanks, they do not dig into defensive positions after taking ground. In short, they are not an army. The only advantage they have is numbers, zeal and the cover of dense urban settings, where Gaddafi forces have been unable to rout them when they stand and fight.
03/29/11 - Where is Lawrence? The exuberance of youth gave way to its equal inexperience when rebel forces, confronted by a well designed blocking position at Nawfaliyah were stopped on the road to Surt, and then pushed back when a column of pro-Gaddafi army reinforcements reached the area from Misurata. The rebels showed that they have almost no real offensive military capability on the open coastal plain, where Gaddafi’s better trained and organized army units seem to scatter them with the slightest sign of an advance. Western correspondents in the region note the young rebel fighters simply race down the roads in pickup trucks, seeing how far they can advance. They do not properly reconnoiter the ground and enemy positions ahead, they do not give thought to protecting their flanks, they do not dig into defensive positions after taking ground. In short, they are not an army. The only advantage they have is numbers, zeal and the cover of dense urban settings, where Gaddafi forces have been unable to rout them when they stand and fight.
Today, the reinforced pro-government forces staged another counterattack, and advanced as far as Bin Jawad in the see-saw battle that again looks much like it did in early March. The rebels do not seem to have learned anything from their earlier defeat when a well equipped Gaddafi battle force pushed all the way to the outskirts of Benghazi before Western air power intervened and pulverized their heavy armor and artillery. Coalition air strikes did not support the recent rebel advance, as the area is a swirl of small units maneuvering this way and that, and the potential for striking the wrong side is real.
But even after losing its tanks and heavy Grad systems to Western strikes, Gaddafi’s army has proved resilient enough to use its experience to beat back the rebel pursuit. The action is now a game of small arms, mortars, machine guns and lighter truck mounted AA guns. The rebels have a few captured Grad missile systems, but do not really know how to properly use them for best effect. What the rebels really need now is a command and control structure. They have no communications aside from word of mouth, which quickly starts panic when attacked, and leads to rash advances. The rebels desperately need a leader to emerge from their ranks who is capable of organizing and controlling them as paramilitary units, and absent that, they need their own modern day version of “Lawrence of Arabia” to help lead their revolt.
Where is Lawrence? This is one situation where a group of tough, experienced and capable mercenaries from western nations could do a world of good, but in the end, this must be a fight made by the Libyans. Don’t look for US or other Western troops on the ground any time soon, though I would not be surprised to learn that “advisors” have already arrived in theater to try and help the rebel cause.
03/28/11 - Nawfaliyah, about 100 miles east of Surt, has become the front line as rebel forces washed up against a blocking position thrown up by Gaddafi forces. They have used mines and artillery fire to delay the rebel advance, though certain elements bypassed the position and actually entered the outskirts of Surt today, finding no significant Gaddafi resistance. In fact, a large convoy of military trucks and civilian cars was seen leaving the city, heading west towards Misurata and Tripoli. (Note: One source indicated that reinforcements finally did arrive late in the day and stiffened the defense at Nawfaliyah.)
This means that the cupboard was bare, at least for the moment, in Surt as far as reinforcements and equipment, and Gaddafi forces there are just buying time so they can get notables, including themselves, safely away from the rebel advance. It is now reported that Coalition air strikes, largely by the British and French, took out nearly all the Gadaffi’s heavy armor in the Khamis and Saadi Brigades at Ajdabiya. In spite of their better experience and training, Gaddafi troops were then outnumbered by about five to one in that battle, and could do nothing more with those odds than mount a delaying withdrawal, which is just a nice way of saying “retreat.”
